Part Three of a Multi-Part Look at Ruben’s Career as Phillies General Manager. We start to look at the abysmal years of 2012 and 2013, where long-term deals start to turn and the Phillies show they are a team on the decline.
Part One of a Look at Ruben’s General Manager Career with the Phillies can be found here: http://philliesfaithful.com/ruben-amaro-the-good-years-part-1/
Part Two of a Look at Ruben’s General Manager Career with the Phillies can be found here: http://philliesfaithful.com/ruben-amaro-the-good-years-part-2/
The Catch Lightning in a Bottle Year – 2012 (-$67.3M ROI and 7.9 WAR)
The 2011 Phillies season ended in heart-breaking fashion, losing a 1-0 game 5 to the St. Louis Cardinals despite taking a 2-1 series lead. The game represented everything that was wrong with the team, an aging offense that could not perform in the clutch or provide the scoring needed to support a great rotation and strong defensive team. It ended in a way that displayed all of the concerns for the future, including the rapid decline and injury risk associated with their old roster. This culminated in agonizing fashion as Ryan Howard blew out his Achilles softly grounding out to end the Phillies hopes now and in the future. This proved the risk of signing a one-dimensional player to a huge contract two seasons prior to him reaching free agency did not outweigh any potential cost savings of not allowing him to reach the market. His value, should have reached free agency after that season, would have been minimal compared to the contract he was given too far in advance.
Here is a look at the transactions made during the 2012 season:
The Off-Season Approach
Ruben’s direction in 2012 was clear, the team was close in 2011, but they needed to strengthen their bullpen and add depth to an aging roster. The Phillies brass was not prepared to give up on the roster and, instead, elected to re-sign Jimmy Rollins and bring in experienced veterans that they thought could help them make another push for the postseason. He made a few minor moves and added veterans Juan Pierre and Chad Qualls, both moves having drastically different results. They had several holes to fill on the roster, but not much money or ability to fill them. Ruben decided, despite this, to invest in the premier reliever on the market for a record deal for a closer, burning a bridge with previous closer, Ryan Madson, after rumors that they had a verbal deal in place. To replace Ryan Howard, in the short-term, Amaro brought back former Phillies star Jim Thome, despite the common thought across the league that he was no longer capable of playing the field.
Continued Diminishing Returns
The decisions Ruben made in 2012 actually generally provided positive value and return on investment for the Phillies in 2012, but only negative value beyond that season. This speaks volumes to the way Ruben makes decisions – he continues to look for short-term gains, while ignoring future risks of loss and diminishing returns. The 2012 transactions, including signing Kevin Frandsen, re-signing Jimmy Rollins, and signing Juan Pierre provided considerable value for the Phillies and all 2012 transactions resulted in a $6.55M return on investment and an additional 8.1 WAR for the organization. However, the overall loss for the Phillies was a result of continued losses and negative return on investment from the decisions Ruben had made prior to the 2012 season, including a -$25M ROI on the first year of Ryan Howard’s contract extension, who was worth -1.1 WAR in 2012. Roy Halladay deal turned quickly negative, as the 2012 season was the first in a rapid decline for the former ace, who was only worth 2.5 WAR in 2012, resulting in a -$9M ROI. Finally, continued lost opportunities and negative ROI due Opportunity Cost plagued the Phillies, who missed out on great years from Jason Grilli, Ryan Vogelsong, and Brandon Moss in 2012, all of whom were previously released, opening the door for Danys Baez, Laynce Nix, Chad Qualls, among other sunken cost transactions for the Phillies. These decisions are the reason why the Phillies are in such a tough position at the moment.
The Deadline Sell
For the first time, Ruben found himself on the outside looking in at the trade deadline. An opportunity came up to sell and turn-around a quick rebuild. There were rumors that the Dodgers would have entertained taking on the Ryan Howard contract in exchange for Cliff Lee, a decision, if true, should have been a no-brainer for Ruben Amaro. We will never know the legitimacy of this rumor, as the Dodgers wound up trading a couple of B prospects to the Red Sox for the contracts of Josh Beckett, Carl Crawford, and Adrian Gonzalez. This transaction ultimately put the Red Sox in a position to compete again and turn around a quick re-build to return to the World Series in 2013. Instead, Ruben played the waiting game, refusing to admit the need to sell until the very last minute, getting very little in terms of return on the assets that he had available to him. He traded Hunter Pence for very little, compared to what he had given up to acquire him less than two years prior, Shane Victorino for a decent, but overvalued return, and Joe Blanton for just salary relief. Time will tell how the prospects turn out, but it seems that, ultimately, Ruben overvalued relief pitching, in a year where his bullpen struggled mightily, and did not get the quality of prospects he could have, had he been focusing on long-term development instead of short-term gain or benefit.
The Extension
At the deadline, Cole Hamels was the single most desired player that was perceived as being available. Instead of trading him, Ruben decided to sign him to a six-year contract extension. At an average salary of $24 Million, Cole will need to continue to perform at an elite level to return positive ROI on the contract, though, as discussed previously, the good will, marketing revenue, and increased value added for having an ace due to diminishing returns jade direct comparison of purely WAR and compensation. In order to exceed his value, on purely a statistical basis, Cole would need to exceed 5 WAR a year over the life of his extension. He has averaged 4.5 WAR over the last three years and roughly 4 WAR throughout his career. Factoring in the fact that he is a legitimate ace with high marketability, this was a more than reasonable extension, though not one that offers the surplus value that defines a team or gives the competitive advantage that the Phillies so desperately need.
Summary
Despite his efforts to build around a solid rotation and supplement his aging position players with veterans, Ruben was not able to catch lightning in a bottle. Instead, the Phillies demonstrated an aging roster on the decline, and injuries plagued a roster that Ruben and the Phillies organization refused to acknowledge was flawed and continually getting passed by younger, more athletic, and healthier organizations, including the Nationals and Braves in their own division. For the first time, the Phillies failed to make the playoffs, and the future could not look riskier for the Phillies. The worst case scenario occurred as the season progressed, the Phillies seemed to improve as they got healthy again. This lead to a false sense of optimism that many feared would define the following offseason, in what should have been make-or-break in the career of Ruben Amaro.
Stay tuned for the fourth and final part of the Ruben Amaro series, a look at the worst year yet, 2013.
